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Market Symmetry and the Tax Efficiency of Equity Compensation
David I. Walker Boston University School of Law; New York University School of Law June 14, 2004 Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 04-05 Abstract: At first blush, the deferral of employee income recognition associated with equity compensation appears to provide a tax advantage in a rising market but an offsetting disadvantage in a declining market. Merton Miller and Myron Scholes argued, however, that this apparent symmetry is misleading and that employees can hedge to ensure tax efficiency despite market uncertainty. This article demonstrates that the effect of employee hedging is fairly small, but that a combination of factors, including capital loss limitations, the possibility of employee-favorable ex post adjustments to equity compensation arrangements, and employee hedging, do cause compensatory stock grants and nonqualified options to be tax advantaged on an expected value basis.
Keywords: stock options, restricted stock, equity compensation, global tax advantage JEL Classifications: H22, K34, M52 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: June 14, 2004 ; Last revised: January 07, 2006Suggested Citation |
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