Abstract

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Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints

Richard H. Steinberg
University of California, Los Angeles - School of Law

UCLA School of Law Research Paper No. 04-9

Abstract:
Judicial lawmaking in the WTO is marked by elastic interpretive discourse and constitutional rules that do not serve as a meaningful restraint. Politics, however, constrains both discursive and constitutional latitude, which should alleviate concerns that WTO judicial lawmaking is so expansive as to undermine the sovereignty of powerful states, create a serious democratic deficit for their citizens, or catalyze withdrawal of their support for the organization.

Keywords: lawmaking, WTO, activism, judicial activism

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: June 16, 2004 ; Last revised: October 13, 2008

Suggested Citation

Steinberg, Richard H., Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints. American Journal of International Law, Vol. 98, No. 2, p. 247, 2004. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=556810

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Contact Information

Richard H. Steinberg (Contact Author)

University of California, Los Angeles - School of Law ( email )

385 Charles E. Young Dr. East
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Los Angeles, CA 90095-1476
United States
310-267-2064 (Phone)
310-206-7010 (Fax)