Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=556810
 
 

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Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints


Richard H. Steinberg


University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law


UCLA School of Law Research Paper No. 04-9

Abstract:     
Judicial lawmaking in the WTO is marked by elastic interpretive discourse and constitutional rules that do not serve as a meaningful restraint. Politics, however, constrains both discursive and constitutional latitude, which should alleviate concerns that WTO judicial lawmaking is so expansive as to undermine the sovereignty of powerful states, create a serious democratic deficit for their citizens, or catalyze withdrawal of their support for the organization.

Keywords: lawmaking, WTO, activism, judicial activism

Accepted Paper Series


Not Available For Download

Date posted: June 16, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Steinberg, Richard H., Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints. American Journal of International Law, Vol. 98, No. 2, p. 247, 2004. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=556810

Contact Information

Richard H. Steinberg (Contact Author)
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law ( email )
385 Charles E. Young Dr. East
Room 1242
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1476
United States
310-267-2064 (Phone)
310-206-7010 (Fax)
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