Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints
Richard H. Steinberg
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law
UCLA School of Law Research Paper No. 04-9
Judicial lawmaking in the WTO is marked by elastic interpretive discourse and constitutional rules that do not serve as a meaningful restraint. Politics, however, constrains both discursive and constitutional latitude, which should alleviate concerns that WTO judicial lawmaking is so expansive as to undermine the sovereignty of powerful states, create a serious democratic deficit for their citizens, or catalyze withdrawal of their support for the organization.
Keywords: lawmaking, WTO, activism, judicial activismAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: June 16, 2004
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