Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints
Richard H. Steinberg
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law
UCLA School of Law Research Paper No. 04-9
Abstract:
Judicial lawmaking in the WTO is marked by elastic interpretive discourse and constitutional rules that do not serve as a meaningful restraint. Politics, however, constrains both discursive and constitutional latitude, which should alleviate concerns that WTO judicial lawmaking is so expansive as to undermine the sovereignty of powerful states, create a serious democratic deficit for their citizens, or catalyze withdrawal of their support for the organization.
Keywords: lawmaking, WTO, activism, judicial activism
Accepted Paper Series
Suggested Citation
Steinberg, Richard H., Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints. American Journal of International Law, Vol. 98, No. 2, p. 247, 2004. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=556810
