Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=556987
 
 

References (45)



 
 

Citations (158)



 


 



The Costs of Entrenched Boards


Lucian A. Bebchuk


Harvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Alma Cohen


Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics; Harvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)


Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 78, pp. 409-433, 2005
Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 478

Abstract:     
This paper investigates empirically how the value of publicly traded firms is affected by arrangements that protect management from removal. Staggered boards, which a majority of U.S. public companies have, substantially insulate boards from removal in either a hostile takeover or a proxy contest. We find that staggered boards are associated with an economically meaningful reduction in firm value (as measured by Tobin's Q). We also provide suggestive evidence that staggered boards bring about, and not merely reflect, an economically significant reduction in firm value. Finally, the correlation with reduced firm value is stronger for staggered boards that are established in the corporate charter (which shareholders cannot amend) than for staggered boards established in the company's bylaws (which shareholders can amend).

The data on which this paper is based is available for downloading at Lucian Bebchuk's home page.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 37

Keywords: Corporate governance, Tobin's Q, firm value, agency costs, boards, directors, takeovers, tender offers, mergers and acquisitions, proxy fights, defensive tactics, antitakeover provisions, staggered boards, poison pills

JEL Classification: G30, G34, K22

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: December 8, 2003 ; Last revised: April 29, 2009

Suggested Citation

Bebchuk, Lucian A. and Cohen, Alma, The Costs of Entrenched Boards. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 78, pp. 409-433, 2005; Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 478. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=556987 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.556987

Contact Information

Lucian A. Bebchuk (Contact Author)
Harvard Law School ( email )
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-3138 (Phone)
617-812-0554 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Alma Cohen
Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics ( email )
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel
Harvard Law School ( email )
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
(617) 496-4099 (Phone)
(617) 812-0554 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 20,528
Downloads: 2,169
Download Rank: 2,857
References:  45
Citations:  158

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo2 in 0.343 seconds