Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=557082
 
 

References (25)



 
 

Citations (20)



 


 



Bank Debt and Corporate Governance


Victoria Ivashina


Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Vinay B. Nair


University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department

Anthony Saunders


New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business

Nadia Massoud


York University - Schulich School of Business


EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings Paper No. 4601
Review of Financial Studies

Abstract:     
In this paper, we investigate the disciplining role of banks and bank debt in the market for corporate control. We find that relationship bank lending intensity and bank client network have positive effects on the probability of a borrowing firm becoming a target. This effect is enhanced in cases where the target and acquirer have a relationship with the same bank. Moreover, we utilize an experiment to show that the effects of relationship bank lending intensity on takeover probability are not driven by endogeneity. Finally, we also investigate reasons motivating a bank's informational role in the market for corporate control.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 66

Keywords: Banks, Corporate Governance, Takeovers, Conflicts of Interest

JEL Classification: G21, G34

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: July 20, 2004 ; Last revised: January 22, 2009

Suggested Citation

Ivashina, Victoria and Nair, Vinay B. and Saunders, Anthony and Massoud, Nadia, Bank Debt and Corporate Governance. EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings Paper No. 4601; Review of Financial Studies. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=557082 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.557082

Contact Information

Victoria Ivashina (Contact Author)
Harvard University ( email )
Harvard Business School
Baker Library 233
Boston, MA 02163
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Vinay B. Nair
University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department ( email )
The Wharton School
3620 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-746-0004 (Phone)
215-898-6200 (Fax)
Anthony Saunders
New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )
44 West 4th Street
9-190, MEC
New York, NY 10012-1126
United States
212-998-0711 (Phone)
212-995-4220 (Fax)
Nadia Massoud
York University - Schulich School of Business ( email )
4700 Keele Street
Toronto, Ontario M3J 1P3
Canada
HOME PAGE: http://www.schulich.yorku.ca/SSB-Extra/Faculty.nsf/faculty/Massoud+Nadia
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 6,686
Downloads: 1,534
Download Rank: 5,262
References:  25
Citations:  20

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo7 in 0.484 seconds