Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=557866
 
 

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More Revenues, Less Distortion? Responding to Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage


Daniel Shaviro


New York University School of Law

2004

NYU, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 04-013

Abstract:     
Transactions commonly known as cross-border tax arbitrages take advantage of inconsistencies between countries' tax rules to achieve more favorable tax results than could have been achieved by investing just in one country. Examples include dual resident companies and double dip leases, in which clever structuring may enable a multinational enterprise to claim the same deduction in two countries. This article analyzes the national and worldwide welfare considerations that may be relevant to a country's deciding whether to allow tax benefits that will be thus duplicated, taking into account strategic interactions with other countries. It also briefly discusses cross-border tax arbitrage in relation to tax harmonization and the proposed creation of multilateral tax institutions akin to the GATT and WTO.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 33

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Date posted: June 21, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Shaviro, Daniel, More Revenues, Less Distortion? Responding to Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage (2004). NYU, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 04-013. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=557866 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.557866

Contact Information

Daniel Shaviro (Contact Author)
New York University School of Law ( email )
40 Washington Square South
Room 314-B
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
212-998-6187 (Phone)
212-995-4341 (Fax)
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