The Effect of Automobile Insurance and Accident Liability Laws on Traffic Fatalities
Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics; Harvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Rajeev H. Dehejia
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Wagner School of Public Service; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA); CESifo
The Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 47, pp. 357-393, 2004
This paper investigates the incentive effects of automobile insurance, compulsory insurance laws, and no-fault liability laws on driver behavior and traffic fatalities. We analyze a panel of 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia from 1970-1998, a period in which many states adopted compulsory insurance regulations and/or no-fault laws. Using an instrumental variables approach, we find evidence that automobile insurance has moral hazard costs, leading to an increase in traffic fatalities. We also find that reductions in accident liability produced by no-fault liability laws have led to an increase in traffic fatalities (estimated to be on the order of 6%). Overall, our results indicate that, whatever other benefits they might produce, increases in the incidence of automobile insurance and moves to no-fault liability systems have significant negative effects on traffic fatalities.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 38
Keywords: No-fault laws, compulsory insurance, moral hazard
JEL Classification: G22, J28, K13Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: September 23, 2004
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