Bankruptcy Reform in Congress: Creditors, Committees, Ideology, and Floor Voting in the Legislative Process
Stanford University - Department of Economics
Princeton University - Department of Politics
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 527-557, 2004
Both ideology and interest group interventions are important in voting on bankruptcy legislation. Roughly 15 votes in the U.S. House of Representatives appear to have been changed directly through interest group pressures proxied by campaign contributions. Many more could have been changed if resources could be fully devoted to spot purchases, but most contributions appear to have been aimed at maintaining legislation on the agenda. In the U.S. Senate, state interests in homestead exemptions influenced voting. Although committee markups demonstrate an ideological lineup that is not distinct from floor voting, committees promote bargaining on destabilizing issues.
Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: June 24, 2004
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