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Bankruptcy Reform in Congress: Creditors, Committees, Ideology, and Floor Voting in the Legislative Process


Stephen Nunez


Stanford University - Department of Economics

Howard Rosenthal


Princeton University - Department of Politics


The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 527-557, 2004

Abstract:     
Both ideology and interest group interventions are important in voting on bankruptcy legislation. Roughly 15 votes in the U.S. House of Representatives appear to have been changed directly through interest group pressures proxied by campaign contributions. Many more could have been changed if resources could be fully devoted to spot purchases, but most contributions appear to have been aimed at maintaining legislation on the agenda. In the U.S. Senate, state interests in homestead exemptions influenced voting. Although committee markups demonstrate an ideological lineup that is not distinct from floor voting, committees promote bargaining on destabilizing issues.

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: June 24, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Nunez, Stephen and Rosenthal, Howard, Bankruptcy Reform in Congress: Creditors, Committees, Ideology, and Floor Voting in the Legislative Process. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 527-557, 2004. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=558365

Contact Information

Stephen Nunez (Contact Author)
Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )
Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States
Howard Rosenthal
Princeton University - Department of Politics ( email )
Corwin Hall
Princeton, NJ 08544-1012
United States
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