Related Party Transactions: Associations with Corporate Governance and Firm Value
Elizabeth A. Gordon
Temple University - Department of Accounting
Rutgers Business School; Center for Contract & Economic Organization
EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings Paper No. 4377
AFA 2006 Boston Meetings Paper
Recent corporate scandals have raised considerable concern among regulators and stock market participants about related party transactions (RPTs), prompting Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) to prohibit personal loans to executives and non-executive board members. In a representative sample of companies for a period that predates SOX, we find RPTs are wide spread and involve equally executives and non-executive board members; additionally, the proportion of related party loans is smaller than other non-loan related party transactions such as purchases or direct services. When we examine the relationship between RPTs and the extant literature's corporate governance mechanisms (such as board characteristics, CEO pay-performance sensitivity, and outside monitors), we generally find weaker corporate governance mechanisms associated with more and higher dollar amounts of RPTs. We also find that industry-adjusted returns are negatively associated with RPTs. On further examination of loans versus other types of RPTs not considered in SOX, we find a negative relationship between industry-adjusted returns and the number and dollar amount of loans to executives and non-executive directors, and a similar relationship between the number of other types of RPTs with non-executive directors. In summary, our results provide support for the view of RPTs as conflicts of interest between managers/board members and their shareholders, in contrast with the view of RPTs as efficient transactions.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 60
Date posted: October 24, 2005
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