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The Theory of Good-Deal Pricing in Financial Markets


Ales Cerny


Cass Business School

Stewart D. Hodges


University of Warwick - Financial Options Research Centre (FORC)


FORC Preprint, No. 98/90
Cass Business School Research Paper

Abstract:     
In this paper the term "good-deal pricing" stands for any pricing technique based on the absence of attractive investment opportunities - good deals - in equilibrium. The theory presented here shows that any such technique can be seen as a generalization of no-arbitrage pricing and that, with a little bit of care, it will contain the no-arbitrage and the representative agent equilibrium as the two opposite ends of a spectrum of possible no-good-deal equilibrium restrictions. We formulate the Extension and the Pricing Theorem in no-good-deal framework and establish general properties of no-good-deal price bounds determined by von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences. Our theory provides common footing to a range of applications, such as Bernardo and Ledoit (2000), Cerny (1999), Cochrane and SaĆ”-Requejo (2000), and Hodges (1998).

Number of Pages in PDF File: 34

Keywords: arbitrage, good deal, virtually desirable claim, state price functional, incomplete market, reward for risk measure, Generalized Sharpe Ratio, admissible price region, equivalent martingale measure

JEL Classification: G12, D40

Accepted Paper Series


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Date posted: July 2, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Cerny, Ales and Hodges, Stewart D., The Theory of Good-Deal Pricing in Financial Markets. FORC Preprint, No. 98/90; Cass Business School Research Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=560682

Contact Information

Ales Cerny (Contact Author)
Cass Business School ( email )
Faculty of Finance
106 Bunhill Row
London
United Kingdom
HOME PAGE: http://www.martingales.info/
Stewart D. Hodges
University of Warwick - Financial Options Research Centre (FORC) ( email )
Warwick Business School
Coventry CV4 7AL
United Kingdom
01203-523606 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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