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Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Companies in the United States
Paul A. Gompers Harvard Business School; Harvard University - Entrepreneurial Management Unit; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) Joy L. Ishii Stanford Graduate School of Business Andrew Metrick Yale School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) May 1, 2008 AFA 2005 Philadelphia Meetings Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Paper No. 12-04 Rock Center for Corporate Governance Working Paper No. 39 Abstract: We construct and analyze a comprehensive list of dual-class firms in the United States and use this list to investigate the relationship between insider ownership and firm value. Our data has two useful features for this valuation analysis. First, since dual-class stock separates cash-flow rights from voting rights, we can separately identify the impact of each. Second, we address endogeneity concerns by using exogenous predictors of dual-class status as instruments. While other data sets have provided one of these features, our data set is the first to provide both. In single-stage regressions, we find strong evidence that firm value is increasing in insiders' cash-flow rights and decreasing in insider voting rights. In instrumental-variable regressions, the point estimates remain the same sign and magnitude, but the significance levels are lower. Working Paper Series Date posted: July 08, 2004 ; Last revised: September 29, 2009Suggested CitationContact Information
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