Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Companies in the United States
Paul A. Gompers
Harvard Business School - Finance Unit; Harvard University - Entrepreneurial Management Unit; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Joy L. Ishii
Stanford Graduate School of Business
Yale School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
May 1, 2008
AFA 2005 Philadelphia Meetings
Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Paper No. 12-04
Rock Center for Corporate Governance Working Paper No. 39
We construct and analyze a comprehensive list of dual-class firms in the United States and use this list to investigate the relationship between insider ownership and firm value. Our data has two useful features for this valuation analysis. First, since dual-class stock separates cash-flow rights from voting rights, we can separately identify the impact of each. Second, we address endogeneity concerns by using exogenous predictors of dual-class status as instruments. While other data sets have provided one of these features, our data set is the first to provide both. In single-stage regressions, we find strong evidence that firm value is increasing in insiders' cash-flow rights and decreasing in insider voting rights. In instrumental-variable regressions, the point estimates remain the same sign and magnitude, but the significance levels are lower.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 61
Date posted: July 8, 2004 ; Last revised: September 29, 2009
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