Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=562841
 
 

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The Impact of Presumed Consent Legislation on Cadaveric Organ Donation: A Cross Country Study


Alberto Abadie


Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Sebastien Gay


University of Chicago - Department of Economics

June 2004

KSG Working Paper No. RWP04-024

Abstract:     
In the U.S., Great Britain, and in many other countries, the gap between the demand and the supply of human organs for transplantation is on the rise, despite the efforts of governments and health agencies to promote donor registration. In some countries of continental Europe, however, cadaveric organ procurement is based on the principle of presumed consent. Under presumed consent legislation, a deceased individual is classified as a potential donor in absence of explicit opposition to donation before death. This article analyzes the impact of presumed consent laws on donation rates. For this purpose, we construct a dataset on organ donation rates and potential factors affecting organ donation for 22 countries over a 10-year period. We find that while differences in other determinants of organ donation explain much of the variation in donation rates, after controlling for those determinants presumed consent legislation has a positive and sizeable effect on organ donation rates.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 41

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Date posted: July 9, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Abadie, Alberto and Gay, Sebastien, The Impact of Presumed Consent Legislation on Cadaveric Organ Donation: A Cross Country Study (June 2004). KSG Working Paper No. RWP04-024. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=562841 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.562841

Contact Information

Alberto Abadie (Contact Author)
Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) ( email )
79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-496-4547 (Phone)
617-495-2575 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Sebastien Gay
University of Chicago - Department of Economics ( email )
1126 East 59th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
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