Partisan Competition, Growth and the Franchise

Abstract:     
The nineteenth century was a time of substantial changes in the patterns of economic growth and the structure of and allocation of political rights. The concurrence of these changes is not coincidental. We develop a model in which ideological parties representing elites use the allocation of voting rights to influence implemented policies, which influence the character of economic growth. We find in the social structure of society an explanation for the connection between enfranchisement and growth: When (1) there exist an economic conflict among the elite, (2) the landed classes are not politically strong, and (3) there exists a critical mass of 'industrial' workers, we observe both growth and democratization. The lack of conditions (1) or (2) resolves in stagnant autocracies while the absence of condition (3) drives growth-deterring democratic expansions. Hence, too much and too little democracy can be bad for growth. Furthermore, economic growth may naturally lead to diffusion of voting rights.

Keywords: Franchise, growth, political competition, elites, industrialization

JEL Classifications: D72, D74, N10, O41, P16

Working Paper Series