Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=564443
 
 

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Does a Better Education Make For Better Managers? An Empirical Examination of CEO Educational Quality and Firm Performance


Aron A. Gottesman


Pace University - Lubin School of Business - Department of Finance and Economics

Matthew R. Morey


Pace University - Lubin School of Business - Department of Finance and Economics

April 21, 2006


Abstract:     
This paper represents the first attempt, to our knowledge, to empirically examine the relationship between the quality of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) education and firm performance. This is an important question as many papers in the management literature have postulated that managers with higher educational attainment will be more adaptive and innovative, and more likely to possess other characteristics that may improve firm performance. We find four results in our analysis. First, using the mean entrance scores as proxies for the prestige of undergraduate and graduate programs, we find no evidence that firms with CEOs from more prestigious schools perform better than firms with CEOs from less prestigious schools. Second, we find that firms managed by CEOs with MBA or law degrees perform no better than firms with CEOs without graduate degrees. Third, we find some limited evidence that firms led by CEOs with non-MBA, non-law graduate degrees have slightly better risk-adjusted market performance than other firms. Fourth, we find that compensation is somewhat higher for CEOs who attended more prestigious schools.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 28

Keywords: CEO education, MBA, GMAT, Performance

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Date posted: July 14, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Gottesman, Aron A. and Morey, Matthew R., Does a Better Education Make For Better Managers? An Empirical Examination of CEO Educational Quality and Firm Performance (April 21, 2006). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=564443 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.564443

Contact Information

Aron A. Gottesman (Contact Author)
Pace University - Lubin School of Business - Department of Finance and Economics ( email )
One Pace Plaza
New York, NY 10038
United States
212-346-1912 (Phone)
212-346-1573 (Fax)
Matthew R. Morey
Pace University - Lubin School of Business - Department of Finance and Economics ( email )
One Pace Plaza
New York, NY 10038-1502
United States
212-618-6471 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://webpage.pace.edu/mmorey/
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