Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=565241
 
 

References (26)



 
 

Citations (8)



 


 



Agency Problems of Excess Endowment Holdings in Not-for-Profit Firms


John E. Core


Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management

Wayne R. Guay


University of Pennsylvania - Accounting Department

Rodrigo S. Verdi


Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

December 15, 2005


Abstract:     
We examine three alternative explanations for excess endowments in not-for-profit firms: (1) growth opportunities, (2) monitoring, or (3) agency problems. Inconsistent with growth opportunities, we find that most excess endowments are persistent over time, and that firms with persistent excess endowments do not exhibit higher growth in program expenses or investments. Inconsistent with better monitoring, program expenditures toward the charitable good are lower for firms with excess endowments, and CEO pay and total officer and director pay are greater for firms with excess endowments. Overall, we find that excess endowments are associated with greater agency problems.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 48

Keywords: Corporate governance, not-for-profit, non-profit, executive compensation, cash holdings, endowment, agency problems

JEL Classification: D82, G34, G31, G35, G38, H20, L31

working papers series





Download This Paper

Date posted: July 19, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Core, John E. and Guay, Wayne R. and Verdi, Rodrigo S., Agency Problems of Excess Endowment Holdings in Not-for-Profit Firms (December 15, 2005). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=565241 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.565241

Contact Information

John E. Core (Contact Author)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )
77 Massachusetts Ave.
E62-416
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Wayne R. Guay
University of Pennsylvania - Accounting Department ( email )
3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States
215-898-7775 (Phone)
215-573-2054 (Fax)

Rodrigo S. Verdi
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) ( email )
Sloan School of Management
100 Main Street E62-679
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
(617) 253 2956 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 3,092
Downloads: 612
Download Rank: 23,469
References:  26
Citations:  8

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo7 in 0.328 seconds