Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=567106
 
 

References (27)



 
 

Citations (19)



 


 



Is European M&A Regulation Protectionist?


Nihat Aktas


WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management

Eric De Bodt


Université Lille Nord de France - SKEMA Business School

Richard Roll


University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Finance Area

February 2006

EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings Paper No. 2318

Abstract:     
Why do regulatory authorities scrutinize mergers and acquisitions? The authorities themselves claim to be combating monopoly power and protecting consumers. But the last two decades of empirical research has found little supporting evidence for such motives. An alternative is that M&A regulation is actually designed to protect privileged firms. We provide a test of protectionism by studying whether European regulatory intervention is more likely when European firms are harmed by increased competition. Our findings raise a suspicion of protectionist motivations by the European regulator during the nineties. The results are robust to many statistical difficulties, including endogeneity between investor valuations and regulatory actions.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 46

Keywords: merger and acquisition regulation protectionism

JEL Classification: G34 G38

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Date posted: July 22, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Aktas, Nihat and de Bodt, Eric and Roll, Richard, Is European M&A Regulation Protectionist? (February 2006). EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings Paper No. 2318. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=567106 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.567106

Contact Information

Nihat Aktas (Contact Author)
WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management ( email )
Burgplatz 2
Vallendar, 56179
Germany
Eric De Bodt
Université Lille Nord de France - SKEMA Business School ( email )
1 place Déliot, BP381
59020 Lille Cedex
France
+03 20 90 74 77 (Phone)
+03 20 90 77 02 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.edebodt.net
Richard W. Roll
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Finance Area ( email )
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481
United States
310-825-6118 (Phone)
310-206-8404 (Fax)
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