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What Happens to CEOs After They Retire? New Evidence on Career Concerns, Horizon Problems, and CEO IncentivesJames A. BrickleySimon Graduate School of Business, University of Rochester Jeffrey L. ColesArizona State University (ASU) - Finance Department James S. LinckSouthern Methodist University December, 1998 Simon School of Business Working Paper FR 97-10 Abstract: This paper provides evidence on a previously unidentified source of managerial incentives: concerns about post-retirement board service. Both the likelihood that a retired CEO serves on his own board two years after departure, as well as the likelihood of serving as an outside director on other boards, are positively and strongly related to his performance while CEO. Retention on the CEO's own board depends primarily on stock returns, while service on outside boards is better explained by accounting returns. The evidence also suggests that firms consider ability in choosing board members.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 48 JEL Classification: G30, G32, J33 working papers seriesDate posted: June 23, 1998Suggested CitationContact Information
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