SSRN Home Search and Download Papers Browse Abstract and Paper Submission Subscribe to Networks View Briefcase Top Papers Top Authors Top Institutions

 

Abstract

 
 

References (11)

Beta

 
 

Citations (5)

Beta

 


 



On the Optimal Specificity of Legal Rules

Vincy Fon
George Washington University - Department of Economics

Francesco Parisi
University of Minnesota - Law School



Journal of Institutional Economics, 2007
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 04-32
Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-17

Abstract:     
European lawmakers are undertaking important steps towards the harmonization, unification, and possible codification of some areas of European private law. In doing so they can choose to craft laws with different levels of detail to guide judges in their decision-making process, incorporating rules or standards into the laws they write. The optimal degree of specificity of legal rules under different environmental conditions and the functionality of these rules or standards are the subject of the present study. First, a basic model of optimal specificity of laws is presented, clarifying the relevance of legal obsolescence and volume of litigation in the optimal choice. We further consider the important influence of codification style, judges' specialization, and complexity of reality on the optimal choice of legislative instrument. The results shed some light on the historical patterns of legislation in various areas of the law, and provide some policy recommendations for the ongoing process of codification in the European context.

Keywords: Rules, Standards, Legislation, Codifications, Optimal Specificity of Laws

JEL Classifications: L51, K00, K20, H43

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: July 27, 2004 ; Last revised: April 26, 2007

Suggested Citation

Fon, Vincy and Parisi, Francesco , On the Optimal Specificity of Legal Rules. Journal of Institutional Economics, 2007; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 04-32; Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-17. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=569401 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.569401


Export to: Export Citation What's this?

Contact Information

Vincy Fon (Contact Author)
George Washington University - Department of Economics ( email )
2115 G Street, N.W.
Monroe Hall, #366
Washington, DC 20052
United States
202-994-7580 (Phone)
202-994-6147 (Fax)
Francesco Parisi
University of Minnesota - Law School ( email )
229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,613
Downloads: 373
Download Rank: 22,215
References: 11
Citations: 5

© 2010 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was served by apollo5b in 0.281 seconds.