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Corruption and the Rate of Temptation: Do Low Wages in the Civil Service Cause Corruption?


Caroline Van Rijckeghem


Sabanci University - Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences; International Monetary Fund (IMF)

B. Weder


affiliation not provided to SSRN
1997

IMF Working Paper No. 97/73

Abstract:     
This paper develops and tests two efficiency wage models of corruption in the civil service. Under fair wage models, civil service wages are an important determinant of corruption. Under shirking models, the level of wages is of secondary importance, as potential bribes dwarf wage income. The empirical evidence points to a negative relationship between corruption and wages across developing countries. Tests as to the validity of the two different efficiency wage models are inconclusive.

JEL Classification: J38, J41, J45, O57

working papers series


Date posted: March 27, 1998  

Suggested Citation

Van Rijckeghem, Caroline and Weder, B., Corruption and the Rate of Temptation: Do Low Wages in the Civil Service Cause Corruption? (1997). IMF Working Paper No. 97/73. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=57168

Contact Information

Caroline Van Rijckeghem (Contact Author)
Sabanci University - Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences ( email )
Orhanli-Tuzla, 34956 Istanbul
Turkey
International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )
700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States
212-229-0704 (Phone)
B. Weder
affiliation not provided to SSRN
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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