Corruption and the Rate of Temptation: Do Low Wages in the Civil Service Cause Corruption?
Caroline Van Rijckeghem
Sabanci University - Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences; International Monetary Fund (IMF)
affiliation not provided to SSRN
IMF Working Paper No. 97/73
This paper develops and tests two efficiency wage models of corruption in the civil service. Under fair wage models, civil service wages are an important determinant of corruption. Under shirking models, the level of wages is of secondary importance, as potential bribes dwarf wage income. The empirical evidence points to a negative relationship between corruption and wages across developing countries. Tests as to the validity of the two different efficiency wage models are inconclusive.
JEL Classification: J38, J41, J45, O57working papers series
Date posted: March 27, 1998
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