A Third Model of Legal Compliance: Testing for Expressive Effects in a Hawk/Dove Game
Richard H. McAdams
University of Chicago Law School
Northwestern University School of Law; American Bar Foundation
July 15, 2004
IACM 17th Annual Conference Paper No. P-107
Economic theories of legal compliance emphasize legal sanctions, while psychological and sociological theories stress the perceived legitimacy of law. Without disputing the importance of either mechanism, we test a third way that law affects behavior, an expressive theory that claims law influences behavior by creating a focal point around which individuals coordinate. We argue that mixed motive games involving coordination model many common disputes, and that, in such games, any third-party cheap talk, including legal rules, that calls the players' attention to a particular equilibrium tends to produce that equilibrium. We investigated how various forms of third party cheap talk influence the behavior of subjects in a Hawk/Dove or Chicken game. Despite the players' conflicting interests, we found that messages highlighting one equilibrium tend to produce that outcome. This result emerged when the message was selected by an overtly random, mechanical process, and also when it was delivered by a third-party subject; the latter effect was significantly stronger than the former only when the subject speaker was selected by a merit-based process. These results suggest that, in certain circumstances, law generates compliance not only by sanctions and legitimacy, but also by facilitating coordination around a focal outcome.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 34
Keywords: law and social conflict, law and dispute resolution, law and decision makingworking papers series
Date posted: August 10, 2004
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