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http://ssrn.com/abstract=577201
 
 

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Efficiency and Fairness of System-Optimal Routing With User Constraints


Andreas S. Schulz


Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management

Nicolas E. Stier-Moses


Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations


Networks, Vol. 48, No. 4, pp. 223-234, 2006

Abstract:     
We study the route-guidance system proposed by Jahn, Möhring, Schulz, and Stier-Moses [Operations Research 53 (2005), 600-616] from a theoretical perspective. As system-optimal guidance is known to be problematic, this approach computes a traffic pattern that minimizes the total travel time subject to user constraints. These constraints are designed to ensure that routes suggested to users are not much longer than shortest paths for the prevailing network conditions. To calibrate the system, a certain measure - called normal length - must be selected.We show that when this length is defined as the travel time at equilibrium, the resulting traffic assignment is provably efficient and close to fair. To measure efficiency, we compare the output to the best solution without guidance and to user equilibria. To measure unfairness, we compare travel times of different users, and show that they do not differ too much. Inefficient or unfair traffic assignments cause users to travel too long or discourage people from accepting the system; either consequence would jeopardize the potential impact of a route-guidance system.

Keywords: Selfish Routing, Price of Anarchy, Computational Game Theory, Multicommodity Flows, Route Guidance, Traffic Assignment

Accepted Paper Series


Not Available For Download

Date posted: August 17, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Schulz, Andreas S. and Stier-Moses, Nicolas E., Efficiency and Fairness of System-Optimal Routing With User Constraints. Networks, Vol. 48, No. 4, pp. 223-234, 2006. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=577201

Contact Information

Andreas S. Schulz (Contact Author)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )
E53-361
77 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02139-4307
United States
617-258-7340 (Phone)
Nicolas E. Stier-Moses
Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations ( email )
New York, NY
United States

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