Network Interconnection and Takings

66 Pages Posted: 20 Sep 2004 Last revised: 5 Oct 2011

See all articles by Adam Candeub

Adam Candeub

Michigan State University - College of Law

Date Written: October 5, 2011

Abstract

Seeking to encourage competitive markets or further other policies, courts and regulators have mandated interconnection between telephone networks and other communications networks. For instance, courts and regulators mandated interconnection between AT&T and the competitive long-distance companies in the 1980s and between the incumbent Bell monopolists and the competitive local exchanges under the 1996 Telecommunications Act. It is generally assumed that these mandatory interconnection regimes require intercarrier payments to avoid a taking under the Fifth Amendment. This legal belief has led in part to burdensome regulatory access charge and intercarrier payment regimes.

In light of recent economic proposals claiming that under some conditions efficient interconnection requires no intercarrier payments, this Article asks whether interconnection without payment constitutes a taking. Drawing on the history of common carriage law and examining the historical property rights of telephone and other communications industries, the Article concludes that interconnection without payment can be consistent with constitutional requirements.

Suggested Citation

Candeub, Adam, Network Interconnection and Takings (October 5, 2011). Syracuse Law Review, Vol, 54, No. 2, 2004, MSU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 02-05, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=578564

Adam Candeub (Contact Author)

Michigan State University - College of Law ( email )

318 Law College Building
East Lansing, MI 48824-1300
United States

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
223
Abstract Views
2,972
Rank
250,548
PlumX Metrics