Plea Bargaining at The Hague
Julian A. Cook
University of Georgia Law School
Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 30, pp. 473-506, 2005
MSU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 03-07
Plea bargaining has come to The Hague. For most of its existence, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) shunned plea bargains. However, under pressure from United Nations member states and the impending deadline for the resolution of its caseload, the ICTY has increasingly relied on plea bargains in recent months. This Article exposes the deficiencies in guilty plea procedures at The Hague, particularly those designed to assess whether a plea is fully informed and voluntary. In a series of case studies, the Article argues that judicial questioning techniques have exploited the vulnerable state of defendants appearing before the court - a disadvantage further entrenched by defense counsel who are unfamiliar with the process of plea bargaining. The inadequacies of plea bargaining at The Hague are particularly important in light of the ICTY's role in setting precedents for other international criminal tribunals. As such, the Article concludes by offering curative measures to ensure greater fairness in the international plea bargaining process. Most notably, the Article proposes that the ICTY should move toward an American-style plea bargaining system to ensure that pleas satisfy standards of procedural fairness.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 35Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: August 30, 2005
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.484 seconds