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Debt Maturity, Risk, and Asymmetric InformationAllen N. BergerUniversity of South Carolina - Moore School of Business; Wharton Financial Institutions Center; Tilburg University - CentER Marco EspinosaInternational Monetary Fund (IMF) W. Scott FrameFederal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Nathan H. MillerU.S. Department of Justice August 2004 Abstract: We test the implications of Flannery's (1986) and Diamond's (1991) models concerning the effects of risk and asymmetric information in determining debt maturity, and we examine the overall importance of informational asymmetries in debt maturity choices. We employ data on over 6,000 commercial loans from 53 large U.S. banks. Our results for low-risk firms are consistent with the predictions of both theoretical models, but our findings for high-risk firms conflict with the predictions of Diamond's model and with much of the empirical literature. Our findings also suggest a strong quantitative role for asymmetric information in explaining debt maturity.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 41 Keywords: Debt maturity, risk, asymmetric information, banks, credit scoring JEL Classification: G32, G38, G21 working papers seriesDate posted: August 24, 2004Suggested CitationContact Information
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