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Debt Maturity, Risk, and Asymmetric Information


Allen N. Berger


University of South Carolina - Moore School of Business; Wharton Financial Institutions Center; Tilburg University - CentER

Marco Espinosa


International Monetary Fund (IMF)

W. Scott Frame


Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta

Nathan H. Miller


U.S. Department of Justice

August 2004



Abstract:     
We test the implications of Flannery's (1986) and Diamond's (1991) models concerning the effects of risk and asymmetric information in determining debt maturity, and we examine the overall importance of informational asymmetries in debt maturity choices. We employ data on over 6,000 commercial loans from 53 large U.S. banks. Our results for low-risk firms are consistent with the predictions of both theoretical models, but our findings for high-risk firms conflict with the predictions of Diamond's model and with much of the empirical literature. Our findings also suggest a strong quantitative role for asymmetric information in explaining debt maturity.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 41

Keywords: Debt maturity, risk, asymmetric information, banks, credit scoring

JEL Classification: G32, G38, G21

working papers series


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Date posted: August 24, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Berger, Allen N., Espinosa, Marco A., Frame, W. Scott and Miller, Nathan H., Debt Maturity, Risk, and Asymmetric Information (August 2004). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=580962 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.580962

Contact Information

Allen N. Berger (Contact Author)
University of South Carolina - Moore School of Business ( email )
Francis M. Hipp Building
Columbia, SC 29208
United States
803-576-8440 (Phone)
803-777-6876 (Fax)
Wharton Financial Institutions Center
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6367
United States
Tilburg University - CentER
P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, DC 5000 LE
Netherlands
Marco A. Espinosa-Vega
International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )
700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States
202-623-8589 (Phone)
202-623-4311 (Fax)
W. Scott Frame
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ( email )
1000 Peachtree Street, NE
Atlanta, GA 30309-4470
United States
404 498 8783 (Phone)
404 498 8810 (Fax)
Nathan H. Miller
U.S. Department of Justice ( email )
450 Fifth St. NW
Room 9418
Washington, DC 20530
United States
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