Doctors Without Borders? Re-licensing Requirements and Negative Selection in the Market for Physicians
Adriana D. Kugler
McCourt School of Public Policy ; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Robert M. Sauer
University of London - Royal Holloway College
Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 437-466, July 2005
Re-licensing requirements for professionals that move across borders are widespread. In this paper, we measure the effects of occupational licensing by exploiting an immigrant physician re-training assignment rule. Instrumental variables and quantile treatment effects estimates indicate large returns to acquiring an occupational license and negative selection into licensing status. We also develop a model of optimal license acquisition which, together with the empirical results, suggests that stricter re-licensing requirements may not only lead to practitioner rents, but also to lower average quality of service in the market for physicians.
Keywords: licensing, immigrants, physicians
JEL Classification: I11, J62, J44, J61
Date posted: September 2, 2004
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