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Managerial Stock Options and the Hedging PremiumNiclas HagelinNordea Bank, Nordea Markets Martin HolmenUniversity of Gothenburg - Department of Economics; Göteborg University - Centre for Finance; Hanken School of Economics Bengt PramborgStockholm University - School of Business John D. KnopfUniversity of Connecticut - Department of Finance August 31, 2004 Abstract: Some studies have provided evidence that hedging increases firm value. Other studies have shown that managerial incentives may influence firm hedging. In this paper we provide evidence that hedging increases firm value, however, when hedging is based upon incentives caused by managers' options, firm value decreases.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 30 Keywords: Hedging, managerial incentives, firm value, risk management JEL Classification: G32, F31 working papers seriesDate posted: September 2, 2004Suggested CitationContact Information
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