Social Networks, Self Denial, and Median Preferences: Conformity as an Evolutionary Strategy
University of Pennsylvania Law School; Erasmus School of Law; PERC - Property and Environment Research Center
University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna
Journal of Socio-Economics, Forthcoming
FSU College of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 126
FSU College of Law, Law and Economics Paper No. 05-01
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 04-41
Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-15
In this article, we suggest that human attitudes of conformity can be understood as a product of adaptation. While existing models of conformity invoke preference falsification in which individuals hide their true preferences, we posit an adaptive mechanism for conformity. Specifically, because non-conformity leads to costs as a dissenting individual is shut out of social networks and majority coalitions in the collective choice context, individuals have an incentive to sublimate their original preferences to a meta-preference for conformity. However, this adaptation is not costless. Resisting original preferences imposes self-denial costs on an individual that may exceed the benefits of conforming. Further, a conforming individual foregoes the small probability that his first-best original preferences will be realized. Thus, this preference modification model of conformity predicts that individuals with high self-denial costs and lower levels of risk aversion will be less likely to conform.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 27
Keywords: Conformism, Endogenous Preferences, Social Networks, Preference Falsification
JEL Classification: K10, D70
Date posted: September 11, 2004
© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.313 seconds