Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=589325
 
 

References (25)



 
 

Citations (2)



 


 



Social Networks, Self Denial, and Median Preferences: Conformity as an Evolutionary Strategy


Jonathan Klick


University of Pennsylvania Law School; Erasmus School of Law; PERC - Property and Environment Research Center

Francesco Parisi


University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna


Journal of Socio-Economics, Forthcoming
FSU College of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 126
FSU College of Law, Law and Economics Paper No. 05-01
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 04-41
Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-15

Abstract:     
In this article, we suggest that human attitudes of conformity can be understood as a product of adaptation. While existing models of conformity invoke preference falsification in which individuals hide their true preferences, we posit an adaptive mechanism for conformity. Specifically, because non-conformity leads to costs as a dissenting individual is shut out of social networks and majority coalitions in the collective choice context, individuals have an incentive to sublimate their original preferences to a meta-preference for conformity. However, this adaptation is not costless. Resisting original preferences imposes self-denial costs on an individual that may exceed the benefits of conforming. Further, a conforming individual foregoes the small probability that his first-best original preferences will be realized. Thus, this preference modification model of conformity predicts that individuals with high self-denial costs and lower levels of risk aversion will be less likely to conform.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 27

Keywords: Conformism, Endogenous Preferences, Social Networks, Preference Falsification

JEL Classification: K10, D70

Accepted Paper Series





Download This Paper

Date posted: September 11, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Klick, Jonathan and Parisi, Francesco, Social Networks, Self Denial, and Median Preferences: Conformity as an Evolutionary Strategy. Journal of Socio-Economics, Forthcoming; FSU College of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 126; FSU College of Law, Law and Economics Paper No. 05-01; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 04-41; Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-15. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=589325 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.589325

Contact Information

Jonathan Klick (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )
3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
2157463455 (Phone)
Erasmus School of Law ( email )
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands
PERC - Property and Environment Research Center
2048 Analysis Drive
Suite A
Bozeman, MT 59718
United States

Francesco Parisi
University of Minnesota - Law School ( email )
229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States
University of Bologna ( email )
Piazza Scaravilli 1
40126 Bologna, fc 47100
Italy
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 3,425
Downloads: 371
Download Rank: 44,971
References:  25
Citations:  2

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.516 seconds