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How Does Privatization Work? Evidence from the Russian Shops


Nicholas Barberis


Yale School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Maxim Boycko


Russian Privatization Center

Andrei Shleifer


Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Natalia Tsukanova


The Boston Consulting Group

November 1994


Abstract:     
A number of recent studies have testified to the benefits of private as opposed to state ownership of firms. One research strand compares private and state firms in the same line of activity, such as air transport or railroads, and finds the former to be more efficient (see Boardman and Vining, 1989, for a survey). A second strand reveals the improvements in a given company's operations following privatization (see Megginson et al., 1994). A third strand documents the lower cost of contracting public services to private suppliers than providing it publicly (see Donahue, 1989). This research makes a convincing case for the greater efficiency of private ownership.

JEL Classification: G30

working papers series


Date posted: February 28, 1995  

Suggested Citation

Barberis, Nicholas, Boycko, Maxim, Shleifer, Andrei and Tsukanova, Natalia, How Does Privatization Work? Evidence from the Russian Shops (November 1994). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=5910

Contact Information

Nicholas Barberis
Yale School of Management ( email )
135 Prospect Street
P.O. Box 208200
New Haven, CT 06520-8200
United States
203-436-0777 (Phone)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Maxim Boycko
Russian Privatization Center
Andrei Shleifer (Contact Author)
Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )
Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-5046 (Phone)
617-496-1708 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/~ashleife/
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Natalia Tsukanova
The Boston Consulting Group
J.F. Kennedylaan 100
3741 EH Baarn
Netherlands
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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