Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=592166
 
 

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Putting Humpty Dumpty Back Together: Experimental Evidence of Anticommons Tragedies


Ben Depoorter


University of California Hastings College of Law; Ghent University - Center for Advanced Studies in Law & Economics

Sven Vanneste


Ghent University-Universiteit Gent - Department of Developmental, Personality and Social Psychology

February 22, 2004

3 Journal of Law, Economics & Policy 1 (2006).

Abstract:     
This Article conducts an experimental investigation of anticommons dilemmas. The results confirm that anticommons deadweight losses increase with the degree of complementarity and the degree of fragmentation of property. Our study further provides three novel insights into the problem of fragmentation. First, the data illustrates that individual right holders ignore the expected value of bundling and instead focus on the maximum profit he or she could realize by bundling. Second, the experiments suggest that uncertainty amplifies the anticommons pricing effect. Finally, cooperation is higher in cases wherethe value of bundling is more uncertain as opposed to scenarios where there is relative certainty of creating surplus but there is a (modest) chance of losses from bundling.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 16

Keywords: Anticommons, property regimes, law and economics

JEL Classification: K10, K11

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Date posted: September 20, 2004 ; Last revised: January 11, 2014

Suggested Citation

Depoorter, Ben and Vanneste, Sven, Putting Humpty Dumpty Back Together: Experimental Evidence of Anticommons Tragedies (February 22, 2004). 3 Journal of Law, Economics & Policy 1 (2006).. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=592166 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.592166

Contact Information

Ben Depoorter (Contact Author)
University of California Hastings College of Law ( email )
200 McAllister Street
San Francisco, CA 94102
United States

Ghent University - Center for Advanced Studies in Law & Economics ( email )
Ghent Univ. Law School
Universiteitstraat 4
Gent, 9000
Belgium
Sven Vanneste
Ghent University-Universiteit Gent - Department of Developmental, Personality and Social Psychology ( email )
Ghent, B-9000
Belgium
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