Putting Humpty Dumpty Back Together: Experimental Evidence of Anticommons Tragedies
University of California Hastings College of Law; Ghent University - Center for Advanced Studies in Law & Economics
Ghent University - Department of Developmental, Personality and Social Psychology
February 22, 2004
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 04-53
This Article conducts an experimental investigation of anticommons dilemmas. The results confirm that anticommons deadweight losses increase with the degree of complementarity and the degree of fragmentation of property. Our study further provides three novel insights into the problem of fragmentation. First, the data illustrates that individual right holders ignore the expected value of bundling and instead focus on the maximum profit he or she could realize by bundling. Second, the experiments suggest that uncertainty amplifies the anticommons pricing effect. Finally, cooperation is higher in cases wherethe value of bundling is more uncertain as opposed to scenarios where there is relative certainty of creating surplus but there is a (modest) chance of losses from bundling.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 30
Keywords: Anticommons, property regimes, law and economics
JEL Classification: K10, K11working papers series
Date posted: September 20, 2004
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