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Tax Planning, Imbalance and Production


Yoram Y. Margalioth


Tel Aviv University - Buchmann Faculty of Law

Eyal Sulganik


Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliyah - Arison School of Business

Rafael Eldor


Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliyah - Arison School of Business

Yoseph M. Edrey


University of Haifa - Faculty of Law

August 29, 2004


Abstract:     
The paper analyzes the case of tax planning that tilts the government gain/loss ratio below one, and provides a proof of a certain type of inefficiency caused by tax planning. As the paper shows, the tax imbalance distorts the firm's output level, providing the firm with an incentive to produce more than the social optimum. This inefficiency is different from the general inefficiency entailed by income taxation, captured by the conventional notion of excess burden. The paper also examines the determinants of this type of distortion and offers some policy implications.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 15

Keywords: tax planning, imbalance, asymmetry, production, inefficiency

JEL Classification: H20, H26, H32, E23, D61, D20

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Date posted: October 15, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Margalioth, Yoram Y., Sulganik, Eyal, Eldor, Rafael and Edrey, Yoseph M., Tax Planning, Imbalance and Production (August 29, 2004). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=593243 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.593243

Contact Information

Yoram Y. Margalioth (Contact Author)
Tel Aviv University - Buchmann Faculty of Law ( email )
Ramat Aviv
Tel Aviv 69978, IL
Israel
+972-3-6407014 (Phone)
+972-3-6409576 (Fax)
Eyal Sulganik
Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliyah - Arison School of Business ( email )
P.O. Box 167
Herzliya, 46150
Israel
972-9-9572307 (Phone)
972-9-9568605 (Fax)
Rafael Eldor
Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliyah - Arison School of Business ( email )
P.O. Box 167
Herzliya, 46150
Israel
972-9-952-7234 (Phone)
972-9-956-3616 (Fax)
Yoseph M. Edrey
University of Haifa - Faculty of Law ( email )
Mount Carmel
Haifa, 31905
Israel
972-4-824-0634 (Phone)
972-4-824-9247 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://law.haifa.ac.il/
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