Arbitration: Governance Benefits and Enforcement Costs
Keith N. Hylton
William Fairfield Warren Distinguished Professor, Boston University; Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law
September 22, 2004
Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 04-09
These remarks, presented at the 2004 AALS Annual Meeting panel on civil procedure, review the economic theory of arbitration and related empirical evidence. For parties who can choose between alternative legal regimes, the key determinants of that choice are the governance benefits and enforcement costs connected to the rules under each regime. The choice between arbitration and litigation should be made on the same basis. The empirical literature, though sparse, suggests that superior governance benefits provide a significant reason for arbitration agreements.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 12
Keywords: arbitration, governance, enforcement, norms, choice between arbitration and litigation
JEL Classification: K00, K13, K14, K42working papers series
Date posted: September 22, 2004
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