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Arbitration: Governance Benefits and Enforcement Costs


Keith N. Hylton


Boston University

September 22, 2004

Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 04-09

Abstract:     
These remarks, presented at the 2004 AALS Annual Meeting panel on civil procedure, review the economic theory of arbitration and related empirical evidence. For parties who can choose between alternative legal regimes, the key determinants of that choice are the governance benefits and enforcement costs connected to the rules under each regime. The choice between arbitration and litigation should be made on the same basis. The empirical literature, though sparse, suggests that superior governance benefits provide a significant reason for arbitration agreements.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 12

Keywords: arbitration, governance, enforcement, norms, choice between arbitration and litigation

JEL Classification: K00, K13, K14, K42

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Date posted: September 22, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Hylton, Keith N., Arbitration: Governance Benefits and Enforcement Costs (September 22, 2004). Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 04-09. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=594301 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.594301

Contact Information

Keith N. Hylton (Contact Author)
Boston University ( email )
765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-353-8959 (Phone)
617-353-3077 (Fax)
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