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The Effects of Systemic Crises When Investors Can Be Crisis Ignorant


Erik Kole


Erasmus University Rotterdam - Erasmus School of Economics - Econometric Institute; ERIM

Marno Verbeek


Erasmus University - Rotterdam School of Management; Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM); Netspar

Kees C. G. Koedijk


Tilburg University - Department of Finance

17 2004 4,

ERIM Report Series Reference No. ERS-2004-027-F&A

Abstract:     
Systemic crises can largely affect asset allocations due to the rapid deterioration of the risk-return trade-off. We investigate the effects of systemic crises, interpreted as global simultaneous shocks to financial markets, by introducing an investor adopting a crisis ignorant or crisis conscious strategy. Including the possibility of a systemic crisis is a substantial improvement. Investments in risky assets fall, while allocations to countries less sensitive to a crisis grow relatively. An increasing probability of a crisis exacerbates these effects. The certainty equivalent costs of ignoring systemic crises are large, ranging from 0.65% per year unconditionally, to over 5% per month conditionally on a high probability for the occurrence of a crisis.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 58

Keywords: asset allocation, systemic risk, international finance, regime switching

JEL Classification: M, M41, G3, G11, G15, F30, C51, G01

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Date posted: August 26, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Kole, Erik, Verbeek, Marno and Koedijk, Kees C. G., The Effects of Systemic Crises When Investors Can Be Crisis Ignorant (17 2004 4,). ERIM Report Series Reference No. ERS-2004-027-F&A. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=594966

Contact Information

Erik Kole (Contact Author)
Erasmus University Rotterdam - Erasmus School of Economics - Econometric Institute ( email )
P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands
+31 10 408 12 58 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://people.few.eur.nl/kole
ERIM
P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands
Marno Verbeek
Erasmus University - Rotterdam School of Management ( email )
P.O. Box 1738
Room T09-53
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands
+31 10 408 2790 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.rsm.nl/mverbeek
Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM)
P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands
Netspar
P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
Kees G. Koedijk
Tilburg University - Department of Finance ( email )
P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 4663048 (Phone)
+31 13 4662052 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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