Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=596142
 


 



Rejecting the Marie Antoinette Paradigm of Prejudgment Interest


Royce De Rohan Barondes


University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law


Brandeis Law Journal, Vol. 43, p. 1, 2004
U of Missouri-Columbia School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2006-01
CORI Working Paper No. 2004-12

Abstract:     
This paper examines principles for properly computing prejudgment interest by examining the impact on different corporate constituencies. This paper concludes that prejudgment interest at a promisor's cost of funds can undercompensate promisees, by shifting value from the promisee's equityholders to its creditors through a forced investment that decreases the risk of the promisee's portfolio of assets.

Keywords: prejudgment interest, corporate constituencies

JEL Classification: K41, K12

Accepted Paper Series





Not Available For Download

Date posted: January 14, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Barondes, Royce de Rohan, Rejecting the Marie Antoinette Paradigm of Prejudgment Interest. Brandeis Law Journal, Vol. 43, p. 1, 2004; U of Missouri-Columbia School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2006-01; CORI Working Paper No. 2004-12. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=596142

Contact Information

Royce De Rohan Barondes (Contact Author)
University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law ( email )
Missouri Avenue & Conley Avenue
Columbia, MO 65211
United States
573-882-1109 (Phone)
573-882-4984 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.missouri-k.com
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