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Strategic Extremism: Why Republicans and Democrats Divide on Religious Values
Edward L. Glaeser Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government, Department of Economics; Brookings Institution; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto CREI - Universitat Pompeu Fabra Jesse M. Shapiro University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) October 2004 Harvard Institute of Economics Research Discussion Paper No. 2044 Abstract: Party platforms differ sharply from one another, especially on issues with religious content, such as abortion or gay marriage. Religious extremism in the U.S. appears to be strategically targeted to win elections, since party platforms diverge significantly, while policy outcomes like abortion rates are not affected by changes in the governing party. Given the high returns from attracting the median voter, why do vote-maximizing politicians veer off into extremism? In this paper, we find that strategic extremism depends on an important intensive margin where politicians want to induce their core constituents to vote (or make donations) and the ability to target political messages towards those core constituents. Our model predicts that the political relevance of religious issues is highest when around one-half of the voting population attends church regularly. Using data from across the world and within the U.S., we indeed find a nonmonotonic relationship between religious extremism and religious attendance.
Keywords: voting, turnout, extremism JEL Classifications: D72, D78, Z12 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: October 04, 2004 ; Last revised: April 22, 2008Suggested CitationContact Information
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