Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=60331
 
 

Footnotes (35)



 


 



The Donation Booth: Mandating Donor Anonymity To Disrupt the Market for Political Influence


Ian Ayres


Yale University - Yale Law School; Yale University - Yale School of Management

Jeremy Bulow


Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

September 1997


Abstract:     
The privacy of the voting booth is now a core feature of our democracy. But surprisingly the secret ballot only became firmly entrenched in America toward the end of the nineteenth century: "Before this reform, people could buy your vote and hold you to your bargain by watching you at the polling place." Voting booth privacy disrupts the economics of vote buying -- making it much more difficult for candidates to buy votes because at the end of the day they can never be sure who voted for them.

We can harness similar benefits by creating a "donation booth" -- a screen that forces donors to funnel campaign contributions through blind trusts. Like the voting booth, the donation booth would keep candidates from learning the identity of their supporters. Mandating anonymous donations -- through a system of blind trusts -- would make it harder for candidates to sell access or influence, because they would never know that the donor had paid the price.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 53

JEL Classification: D70

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: September 17, 1997  

Suggested Citation

Ayres, Ian and Bulow, Jeremy, The Donation Booth: Mandating Donor Anonymity To Disrupt the Market for Political Influence (September 1997). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=60331 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.60331

Contact Information

Ian Ayres (Contact Author)
Yale University - Yale Law School ( email )
P.O. Box 208215
New Haven, CT 06520-8215
United States
203-432-7101 (Phone)
203-432-2592 (Fax)
Yale University - Yale School of Management
135 Prospect Street
P.O. Box 208200
New Haven, CT 06520-8200
United States
Jeremy I. Bulow
Stanford University ( email )
Room L 237
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States
650-723-2160 (Phone)
650-725-0468 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 3,007
Downloads: 177
Download Rank: 94,970
Footnotes:  35

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.422 seconds