Imperfect Competition in Financial Markets and Capital Structure
Sergei M. Guriev
New Economic School (NES); Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
University of Adelaide - School of Economics
We consider a model of corporate finance with imperfectly competitive financial intermediaries. Firms can finance projects either via debt or via equity. Because of asymmetric information about firms' growth opportunities, equity financing involves a dilution cost. Nevertheless, equity emerges in equilibrium whenever financial intermediaries have sufficient market power. In the latter case, best firms issue debt while the less profitable firms are equity-financed. We also show that strategic interaction between oligopolistic intermediaries results in multiple equilibria. If one intermediary chooses to buy more debt, the price of debt decreases, so the best equity-issuing firms switch from equity to debt financing. This in turn decreases average quality of equity-financed pool, so other intermediaries also shift towards more debt.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 35
Keywords: Capital structure, pecking order theory of finance, oligopoly in financial markets, second degree price discrimination
JEL Classification: D43, G32, L13working papers series
Date posted: October 14, 2004
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