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Cordell Hull, the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act, and the WTO

Kenneth W. Dam
University of Chicago - Law School; Brookings Institution


October 2004

U Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 228

Abstract:     
Cordell Hull, President Franklin Roosevelt's Secretary of State from 1933 to 1945, developed a set of ideas about free trade that formed the basis for the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934. The ideas were, in turn, the fundamental negotiating principles of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and are still the basis for the World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha round of trade negotiations. The principles include reciprocity, nondiscrimination, advance trade negotiating authority from the U.S. Congress, and automatic implementation of tariff agreements reached out of the public eye between professional negotiators. Later, as GATT negotiations moved beyond tariffs to non-tariff barriers involving domestic law, Congress began to refuse to implement the resulting agreements, an impediment that was overcome by "fast track" Congressional implementation. The fast track process is being undermined by the U.S. Congress through statutory provisions that give individual Congressmen the right to be informed before proposals are tabled by U.S. negotiators (thereby affording protectionist interests an opportunity to influence the negotiations) as well as by a mid-round reauthorization process that gives one House the opportunity to abort the negotiations. The original Hull principles have to be revisited if the movement toward freer trade is not to be arrested.

Keywords: GATT/WTO, World Trade Organization

Working Paper Series

Date posted: October 21, 2004 ; Last revised: December 18, 2004

Contact Information

Kenneth W. Dam (Contact Author)
University of Chicago - Law School ( email )
1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-0216 (Phone)
773-702-0356 (Fax)
Brookings Institution ( email )
1775 Massachusetts Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20036-2188
United States
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