Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=604702
 
 

Citations (20)



 
 

Footnotes (67)



 


 



Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won't Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help


Joseph Farrell


University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics

Robert P. Merges


University of California, Berkeley - School of Law


Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Annual Review of Law and Technology, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2004

Abstract:     
Given the limits on Patent Office scrutiny of patent applications, one might hope that ex post litigation can fix at least the important errors. Unfortunately, the often grossly skewed incentives to challenge and to defend issued patents make this view too optimistic. Since litigation cannot fix all errors, we urge better USPTO funding and higher standards of initial review, better incentives (not limited to formal duties) for applicants to find and disclose prior art information, and the creation of a cheap and workable administrative post-issue review. We explain why existing administrative reviews are not a workable system, and recommend some features that a new system should have.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 28

Keywords: patents, uspto, law

Accepted Paper Series





Download This Paper

Date posted: October 14, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Farrell, Joseph and Merges, Robert P., Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won't Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help. Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Annual Review of Law and Technology, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2004. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=604702

Contact Information

Joseph Farrell (Contact Author)
University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics ( email )
549 Evans Hall #3880
Berkeley, CA 94720-3880
United States
510-642-9854 (Phone)
510-642-6615 (Fax)
Robert P. Merges
University of California, Berkeley - School of Law ( email )
215 Boalt Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States
510-643-6199 (Phone)
510-643-6171 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 4,788
Downloads: 505
Download Rank: 31,287
Citations:  20
Footnotes:  67

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.266 seconds