Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=60768
 
 

References (27)



 
 

Citations (34)



 


 



Auctions with Private Uncertainty and Resale Opportunities


Philip A. Haile


Yale University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

December 1997

9801

Abstract:     
This paper studies auctions held before bidders are sure of the values they place on the object for sale, leaving potential gains to subsequent resale trade. While important insights from models of auctions without resale carry over, equilibrium bidding can be fundamentally altered by the endogeneity of valuations and the informational linkages between primary and secondary markets. As a result, models ignoring resale may often misguide policy and interpretation of bidding data. Furthermore, results regarding players' incentives to signal through their bids, the effects of resale on auction revenues, an d revenue comparisons between standard auctions depend on the structure of the secondary market.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 47

JEL Classification: D44, D89

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Date posted: February 20, 1998  

Suggested Citation

Haile, Philip A., Auctions with Private Uncertainty and Resale Opportunities (December 1997). 9801. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=60768 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.60768

Contact Information

Philip A. Haile (Contact Author)
Yale University - Department of Economics ( email )
28 Hillhouse Ave
New Haven, CT 06520-8264
United States
203-432-3568 (Phone)
203-432-6323 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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