National Courts, Global Cartels: F. Hoffman-LaRoche LTD. v. Empagran, S.A. (U.S. Supreme Court 2004)
Hannah L. Buxbaum
Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington
German Law Journal, Vol. 5, No. 9, pp. 1095-1106, 2004
This comment discusses the Supreme Court's recent decision in Hoffman-LaRoche v. Empagran, an action brought by foreign plaintiffs under U.S. antitrust law to recover damages caused by the activities of a global price-fixing cartel. It describes the jurisdictional issues raised by conduct that affects the global market for a particular good, and analyzes the Court's reliance on notions of comity to restrain the reach of U.S. antitrust law. It argues, however, that the decision does not in fact undermine the anti-comity approach adopted in the 1993 Hartford Fire case, as the Court here assumes that the cartel's effects in the United States were entirely independent of its effects in other countries and therefore unrelated to the plaintiffs' injuries. The comment concludes by noting that the Court left open a number of important questions, including the precise content of a comity analysis and the relationship between private and public enforcement of antitrust law.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 13
Keywords: Antitrust, comityAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: November 8, 2004
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