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The Existence of Informationally Efficient Markets when Individuals are Rational

Marc-Andreas Muendler
University of California, San Diego - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)


October 2004

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1295

Abstract:     
A rational-expectations equilibrium with positive demand for financial information does exist under fully revealing asset price - contrary to a wide-held conjecture. Generalizing the common additive signal-return model with CARA utility to the family of distributions with moment generating functions, this paper shows that individual investors endowed with an average portfolio demand information in equilibrium if they can adjust portfolio size. More information diminishes the expected excess return of a risky asset so that investors who only have a choice of portfolio composition or whose asset endowments strongly differ from the average portfolio are worse off. Under fully revealing price, information market equilibria both with and without information acquisition are Pareto efficient.

Keywords: information, efficiency, financial markets, portfolio theory

JEL Classifications: D82, D83, G14

Working Paper Series

Date posted: October 29, 2004 ; Last revised: March 28, 2005

Suggested Citation

Muendler, Marc-Andreas, The Existence of Informationally Efficient Markets when Individuals are Rational (October 2004). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1295. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=612142


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Contact Information

Marc-Andreas Muendler (Contact Author)
University of California, San Diego - Department of Economics ( email )
9500 Gilman Drive
La Jolla, CA 92093-0508
United States
858-534-4799 (Phone)
858-534-7040 (Fax)
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Poschinger Str. 5
DE-81679 Munich Germany
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