|
||||
|
||||
Imperfect Price Discrimination, Market Structure and Efficiency
Qihong Liu University of Oklahoma - Department of Economics Konstantinos Serfes Drexel University - Department of Economics & International Business January 14, 2005 Abstract: We introduce a flexible framework by modeling the information firms possess about consumers' locations (preferences) on the Salop circle as a partition. Higher information quality is translated into a partition refinement. In the limit, we obtain the perfect price discrimination paradigm. We show that the free-entry equilibrium number of firms exhibits a U-shape as a function of the quality of information. This implies that some (but not too much) price discrimination yields the most efficient non-cooperative outcome.
Keywords: Free-entry, Price discrimination, Market structure, Efficiency JEL Classifications: D43, L11, L43 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: November 08, 2004 ; Last revised: November 30, 2005Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
© 2009 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Terms of Use Privacy Policy
This page was served by apollo3 in 0.093 seconds.