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The Role of Government in Corporate Governance

Cary Coglianese
University of Pennsylvania Law School

Thomas J. Healey
Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government

Elizabeth K. Keating
Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government

Michael L. Michael
Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government


November 2004

KSG Working Paper No. RWP04-045

Abstract:     
Numerous corporate scandals in the past several years have fueled widespread debate over proposals for government action. The central challenge for government is how to restore corporate integrity and market confidence without overreacting and stifling the dynamism that underlies a strong economy. To examine this challenge, the Center for Business and Government's Regulatory Policy Program organized a conference in May 2004 on The Role of Government in Corporate Governance. The conference brought together government officials, business leaders, and academic researchers to discuss three fundamental public policy issues raised by recent corporate abuses. First, who should regulate corporate management - government agencies or self-regulatory organizations? Second, how should regulatory commands be designed, either as detailed rules or broad principles? Finally, how should regulations be enforced? This report synthesizes the conference dialogue organized around these three questions and explores conditions under which different configurations of regulatory institutions, standards, and enforcement practices can further both corporate integrity and productivity.

Keywords: corporate governance, financial regulation, self-regulation, regulatory enforcement

JEL Classifications: G34, G38, K22, M49

Working Paper Series

Date posted: November 02, 2004 ; Last revised: December 08, 2004

Contact Information

Cary Coglianese (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )
3400 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6204
United States
215-898-6867 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.upenn.edu/coglianese
Thomas J. Healey
Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government ( email )
79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Elizabeth K. Keating
Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government ( email )
79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-9856 (Phone)
617-495-8963 (Fax)
Michael L. Michael
Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government ( email )
79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-5402 (Phone)
617-496-0063 (Fax)
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