Institutional Versus Individual Investment in Ipos: The Importance of Firm Fundamentals

AFA 2006 Boston Meetings Paper

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 44 (2009)

47 Pages Posted: 4 Nov 2004 Last revised: 16 Aug 2023

See all articles by Laura Casares Field

Laura Casares Field

University of Delaware - Alfred Lerner College of Business and Economics

Michelle Lowry

Drexel University; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: November 4, 2005

Abstract

Over both short and long horizons, IPOs with greater institutional shareholdings outperform those with smaller institutional shareholdings. Over a one-quarter horizon, institutions can identify firms that beat market benchmarks. Over the long-run, however, institutions' advantage lies entirely in their ability to avoid firms that exhibit the worst performance. Institutions appear to rely heavily on readily available firm and offer characteristics when making their investment decisions. In contrast, individual investors are less likely to consider such characteristics and, as a result, they invest disproportionately in poorly performing firms. However, a simple strategy of investing in higher quality firms, for example, firms with positive earnings prior to the IPO, would enable individuals to avoid much of this underperformance.

Keywords: Initial public offerings, institutional investors, individual investors, long-run performance

JEL Classification: G24, G14

Suggested Citation

Field, Laura Casares and Lowry, Michelle B., Institutional Versus Individual Investment in Ipos: The Importance of Firm Fundamentals (November 4, 2005). AFA 2006 Boston Meetings Paper, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 44 (2009), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=613563 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.613563

Laura Casares Field (Contact Author)

University of Delaware - Alfred Lerner College of Business and Economics ( email )

419 Purnell Hall
Newark, DE 19716
United States
302-831-3810 (Phone)

Michelle B. Lowry

Drexel University ( email )

3141 Chestnut St
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

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