Abstract

 
 

References (45)



 
 

Citations (10)



 


 



Corporate Diversification in East Asia: The Role of Ultimate Ownership and Group Affiliation


Joseph P. H. Fan


Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) - School of Accountancy

Stijn Claessens


International Monetary Fund (IMF); University of Amsterdam - Finance Group; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Tinbergen Institute; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Simeon Djankov


Ministry of Finance; World Bank

Larry H.P. Lang


Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) - Department of Finance

November 1999

World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2089

Abstract:     
Some East Asian firms diversify to circumvent external factor markets subject to high transaction costs. Other diversify as a means of expropriation by large stockholders. There is evidence that group affiliation is used to complement firm-level diversification in the creation of internal markets.

Using data for more than 2,000 companies from nine East Asian economies, Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang examine the interactions between ultimate ownership, group affiliation, and corporate diversification.
They find evidence that allocating resources within business groups is associated with higher market valuation when external markets are less developed.

They also find that group affiliation and firm-level diversification are used complementarily to exploit the relative cost-effectiveness of internal markets.

They reject the hypothesis that diversification patterns can be explained by large blockholders' incentive to reduce risk. But they find support for the hypothesis that controlling owners use diversification to expropriate other shareholders.

Group affiliation is widespread among publicly traded corporations in East Asia. Group-affiliated firms are on average associated with diversification discounts. Further analysis reveals that the discounts are attributable to diversified firms in the more developed East Asian economies. By contrast, group affiliation positively contributes to diversification performance in less developed economies.

The authors find that group-affiliated firms are more likely to diversify in developing economies but are equally likely to diversify in developed economies.

When diversifying in more developed economies, group-affiliated firms destroy more value than do independent firms. In developing economies, group-affiliated firms are more likely than independent firms to benefit from diversification in developing economies.

This paper - a product of the Financial Economics Unit, Financial Operations Vice Presidency - is part of a larger effort in the vice presidency to study corporate performance patterns in East Asia.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 32

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: November 8, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Fan, Joseph P. H., Claessens, Stijn, Djankov, Simeon and Lang, Larry H.P., Corporate Diversification in East Asia: The Role of Ultimate Ownership and Group Affiliation (November 1999). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2089. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=615021

Contact Information

Po Hung Joseph P. H. Fan
Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) - School of Accountancy ( email )
Shatin, N.T.
Hong Kong
(852) 26097839 (Phone)
(852) 26035114 (Fax)
Stijn Claessens
International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )
700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States
202-623-7641 (Phone)
202-5897641 (Fax)
University of Amsterdam - Finance Group ( email )
Roetersstraat 18
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands
+31 20 525 6020 (Phone)
+31 20 525 5285 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.fee.uva.nl/fm/index.htm
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Tinbergen Institute ( email )
Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Simeon Djankov (Contact Author)
Ministry of Finance ( email )
Rakovski Avenue 102
Sofia, 1040
Bulgaria
World Bank ( email )
2121 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States
202-473-4748 (Phone)
202-473-5758 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.doingbusiness.org
Hsien Ping Larry Lang
Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) - Department of Finance ( email )
Shatin, N.T.
Hong Kong
+85 2 2609 7761 (Phone)
+85 2 2603 6586 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 2,129
Downloads: 690
Download Rank: 16,316
References:  45
Citations:  10

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo6 in 1.672 seconds