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Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries?


Eric Neumayer


London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)

Laura Spess


London School of Economics - Department of Geography and Environment

May 1, 2005

World Development, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 31-49, 2005

Abstract:     
Foreign investors are often skeptical toward the quality of the domestic institutions and the enforceability of the law in developing countries. Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) guarantee certain standards of treatment that can be enforced via binding investor-to-state dispute settlement outside the domestic juridical system. Developing countries accept restrictions on their sovereignty in the hope that the protection from political and other risks leads to an increase in foreign direct investment (FDI), which is also the stated purpose of BITs. We provide the first rigorous quantitative evidence that a higher number of BITs raises the FDI that flows to a developing country. This result is very robust to changes in model specification, estimation technique and sample size. There is also some limited evidence that BITs might function as substitutes for good domestic institutional quality, but this result is not robust to different specifications of institutional quality.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 132

Keywords: Foreign direct investment, bilateral investment treaties, institutional quality, protection, risk

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Date posted: November 11, 2004 ; Last revised: June 24, 2010

Suggested Citation

Neumayer, Eric and Spess, Laura, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries? (May 1, 2005). World Development, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 31-49, 2005 . Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=616242 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.616242

Contact Information

Eric Neumayer (Contact Author)
London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) ( email )
Houghton Street
WC2A 2AE London
United Kingdom
+44 207 955 7598 (Phone)
+44 207 955 7412 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://personal.lse.ac.uk/neumayer
Laura Spess
London School of Economics - Department of Geography and Environment ( email )
Houghton Street
WC2A 2AE London
United Kingdom
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