Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=617446
 
 

References (21)



 
 

Citations (5)



 


 



Stochastic Synergies in Sequential Auctions


Dakshina G. De Silva


Department of Economics, Lancaster University Management School

Thomas D. Jeitschko


Michigan State University - Department of Economics

Georgia Kosmopoulou


University of Oklahoma - Department of Economics

November 2004



Abstract:     
We consider sequential construction contracts in which bidders may benefit from one auction to the next due to synergistic tasks across the projects auctioned. Theoretical considerations indicate that winners in the former auctions are more likely to participate in latter auctions. Moreover, conditional on participation, past winners place lower bids, on average, and are so more likely to win in later auctions. We present evidence in support of these predictions using sequential construction auctions conducted by the Oklahoma Department of Transportation.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 42

Keywords: Sequential auctions, synergies, multi-unit auctions, procurement auctions

JEL Classification: D44

working papers series





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Date posted: November 12, 2004  

Suggested Citation

De Silva, Dakshina G. and Jeitschko, Thomas D. and Kosmopoulou, Georgia, Stochastic Synergies in Sequential Auctions (November 2004). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=617446 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.617446

Contact Information

Dakshina G. De Silva
Department of Economics, Lancaster University Management School ( email )
Lancaster LA1 4YX
United Kingdom
Thomas D. Jeitschko (Contact Author)
Michigan State University - Department of Economics ( email )
110 Marshall-Adams Hall
East Lansing, MI 48824
United States
517-355-8302 (Phone)
517-432-1068 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.msu.edu/~jeitschk/
Georgia Kosmopoulou
University of Oklahoma - Department of Economics ( email )
729 Elm Avenue
203 Hester hall
Norman, OK 73019-2103
United States
405-325-3083 (Phone)
405-325-5842 (Fax)
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