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Stochastic Synergies in Sequential Auctions

Dakshina G. De Silva
Texas Tech University - Department of Economics

Thomas D. Jeitschko
Michigan State University - Department of Economics; University of London - Department of Economics

Georgia Kosmopoulou
University of Oklahoma - Department of Economics


November 2004



Abstract:     
We consider sequential construction contracts in which bidders may benefit from one auction to the next due to synergistic tasks across the projects auctioned. Theoretical considerations indicate that winners in the former auctions are more likely to participate in latter auctions. Moreover, conditional on participation, past winners place lower bids, on average, and are so more likely to win in later auctions. We present evidence in support of these predictions using sequential construction auctions conducted by the Oklahoma Department of Transportation.

Keywords: Sequential auctions, synergies, multi-unit auctions, procurement auctions

JEL Classifications: D44

Working Paper Series

Date posted: November 12, 2004 ; Last revised: November 12, 2004

Suggested Citation

De Silva, Dakshina G., Jeitschko, Thomas D. and Kosmopoulou, Georgia, Stochastic Synergies in Sequential Auctions (November 2004). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=617446


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Contact Information

Thomas D. Jeitschko (Contact Author)
Michigan State University - Department of Economics ( email )
110 Marshall-Adams Hall
East Lansing, MI 48824
United States
517-355-8302 (Phone)
517-432-1068 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.msu.edu/~jeitschk/
University of London - Department of Economics ( email )
Royal Holloway, University of London
Egham
Surrey TW20 0EX United Kingdom
HOME PAGE: http://personal.rhul.ac.uk/uste/122/
Dakshina G. De Silva
Texas Tech University - Department of Economics ( email )
Lubbock, TX 79409-1014
United States
806-742-2466 Ext. 237 (Phone)
806-742-1137 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://webpages.acs.ttu.edu/kdesilva/
Georgia Kosmopoulou
University of Oklahoma - Department of Economics ( email )
729 Elm Avenue
203 Hester hall
Norman, OK 73019-2103
United States
405-325-3083 (Phone)
405-325-5842 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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