Batch Queues with Choice of Arrivals: Equilibrium Analysis and Experimental Study
William E. Stein
Texas A&M University - Mays Business School
University of Arizona - Eller College of Management
Darryl A. Seale
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST) - Department of Information & Systems Management
University of California, Riverside
September 24, 2004
We study both theoretically and experimentally the decisions players make in two queueing games with batch service. In both games, players are asked to independently decide when to join a discrete-time queue to receive service, or they may simply choose not to join it at all. Equilibrium solutions in pure and mixed strategies are constructed for two games where balking is prohibited and where it is allowed. They are then tested experimentally in a study that varies the game type (balking vs. no balking) and information structure (private vs. public information) in a 2X2 between-subject design. With repeated iterations of the stage game, all four experimental conditions result in aggregate, but not individual, behavior approaching mixed-strategy equilibrium play.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 45
Keywords: Batch queueing, equilibrium solution, experimental economics
JEL Classification: C90, Z13working papers series
Date posted: November 22, 2004
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