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Fiscal Discipline and the Cost of Public Debt Service: Some Estimates for OECD Countries


Silvia Ardagna


National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Goldman Sachs - London

Francesco Caselli


London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Timothy Lane


International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Policy Development and Review Department

November 2004

ECB Working Paper No. 411

Abstract:     
We use a panel of 16 OECD countries over several decades to investigate the effects of government debts and deficits on long-term interest rates. In simple static specifications, a one-percentage-point increase in the primary deficit relative to GDP increases contemporaneous long-term interest rates by about 10 basis points. In a vector autoregression (VAR), the same shock leads to a cumulative increase of almost 150 basis points after 10 years. The effect of debt on interest rates is non-linear: only for countries with above-average levels of debt does an increase in debt affect the interest rate. World fiscal policy is also important: an increase in total OECD-government borrowing increases each country's interest rates. However, domestic fiscal policy continues to affect domestic interest rates even after controlling for worldwide debts and deficits.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 38

Keywords: Governement deficit, public debt, long-term interest rates

JEL Classification: E62, E44, H62

working papers series


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Date posted: December 13, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Ardagna, Silvia, Caselli, Francesco and Lane, Timothy, Fiscal Discipline and the Cost of Public Debt Service: Some Estimates for OECD Countries (November 2004). ECB Working Paper No. 411. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=617804

Contact Information

Silvia Ardagna (Contact Author)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Goldman Sachs - London ( email )
130 Peterborough Court
133 Fleet Street
London, EC4A 2BB
United Kingdom
Francesco Caselli
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Economics ( email )
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Timothy Lane
International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Policy Development and Review Department ( email )
700 19th St. NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States
202-623-7648 (Phone)
202-623-4405 (Fax)
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