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http://ssrn.com/abstract=618484
 
 

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Co-opetition in Standard-Setting: The Case of the Compact Disc


Tobias Kretschmer


Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München - Faculty of Business Administration (Munich School of Management); London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)

Katrin Muehlfeld


Utrecht University - Utrecht University School of Economics; University of Trier - Faculty of Management

October 2004

NET Institute Working Paper No. 04-14

Abstract:     
The success of the CD has (partly) been attributed to the ability of Sony, Philips and Matsushita to cooperate in the run-up to the DAD conference in 1981, where the technological standard was set. We model the situation leading up to the conference in a simple game with technological progress and the possibility of prelaunching a technology. We identify players' tradeoffs between prelaunching (which ends technological progress) and continued development (which involves the risk of being pre-empted). Contrasting outcomes with complete and incomplete information, we find that there appeared to be considerable uncertainty about rivals' technological progress.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 32

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Date posted: November 15, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Kretschmer, Tobias and Muehlfeld, Katrin, Co-opetition in Standard-Setting: The Case of the Compact Disc (October 2004). NET Institute Working Paper No. 04-14. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=618484 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.618484

Contact Information

Tobias Kretschmer
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München - Faculty of Business Administration (Munich School of Management) ( email )
Kaulbachstr. 45
Munich, 80539
Germany
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
Katrin Muehlfeld (Contact Author)
Utrecht University - Utrecht University School of Economics ( email )
Kriekenpitplein 21-22
Adam Smith Building
Utrecht, +31 30 253 7373 3584 EC
Netherlands
University of Trier - Faculty of Management ( email )
Germany
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