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The Case for Restricting Access to Courts


Michael C. Jensen


Harvard Business School; Social Science Electronic Publishing (SSEP), Inc.; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

William H. Meckling


Simon School, University of Rochester (Deceased)

Clifford G. Holderness


Boston College - Department of Finance

May 1, 1981

MERC Working Paper No. 81-06
Harvard Business School NOM Unit Working Paper No. 1981

Abstract:     
This article examines unrecognized implications of various doctrines governing access to court. The analysis indicates that doctrines such as standing, res judicata and collateral estoppel have far reaching implications for the nature of adjudication and the basic structure of rights in society. A liberal standing doctrine causes Peremptory Adjudication, creates inalienable rights and erodes the common law doctrine against suing competitors. Inalienability of rights causes the Coase Theorem to fail and creates externalities. Furthermore, allowing suit over non-contractual pure value effects creates closed market monopolies. All these factors reduce efficiency and thereby reduce human welfare. In this sense the analysis (1) indicates the widespread enthusiasm for democratization of the courts is mistaken, and (2) provides the case for restricting access to the courts.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 40

Keywords: standing, stare decisis, res judicata, collateral estoppel, Coase Theorem, courts, legal system, efficiency, adjudication, rights, externalities

JEL Classification: K1, K2, K3, K4

working papers series


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Date posted: December 28, 2004 ; Last revised: January 17, 2011

Suggested Citation

Jensen, Michael C., Meckling, William H. and Holderness, Clifford G., The Case for Restricting Access to Courts (May 1, 1981). MERC Working Paper No. 81-06; Harvard Business School NOM Unit Working Paper No. 1981. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=618765 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.618765

Contact Information

Michael C. Jensen (Contact Author)
Harvard Business School ( email )
Soldiers Field
Negotiations, Organizations & Markets
Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-510-3363 (Phone)
305-675-3166 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://drfd.hbs.edu/fit/public/facultyInfo.do?facInfo=ovr&facId=6484
Social Science Electronic Publishing (SSEP), Inc. ( email )
7858 Sanderling Road
Sarasota, FL 34242
United States
617-510-3363 (Phone)
305 675-3166 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://ssrn.com/author=9

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
William H. Meckling
Simon School, University of Rochester (Deceased)
Clifford G. Holderness
Boston College - Department of Finance ( email )
Carroll School of Management
140 Commonwealth Avenue
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467-3808
United States
617-552-2768 (Phone)
617-277-8071 (Fax)
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